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Examining labour market developments in Brazil, the fastest
growing economy in Latin America over the twenty years through
1985, means dealing with the impact and interactions of poli-
cies in a multifacetted country the size of a continent, har-
boring very large differences in population densities and
income levels. However, as the title of the paper already
implies, no attempt is made to do justice to all the manifold
issues engendered within such a complex economy . The paper is
thus limited to focussing on macroeconomic and sectoral labour
market developments - be they on the demand or supply side of
labour/human capital - and in this context on the impact of
policies within the formal sector. The basic thrust of the
evidence presented thereby is aimed at determining to what
extent labour market policies in Brazil (especially as they
impacted on the manufacturing industry) allowed labour to be
efficiently employed.
The paper begins by outlining overall labour market trends and
structures as they evolved within general economic develop-
ments in Brazil (and other countries) over the two decades
through the mid 80's, placing stress thereby on recent events.
This is followed in Section III by an overview of factors
influencing/shaping the demand for labour, first generally
speaking and on a comparative international basis before turn-
ing then to policies directly affecting the price of labour in
Brazil (e.g. minimum wages and wage indexation). The impact of
such policies is further examined in Section IV, moving from
the primarily macroeconomic thrust in Section III to a
sectoral analysis of two specifically selected industries: the
clothing and automobile industry. These industries are prime
examples of traditional (i.e. the clothing industry) and non-
traditional (i.e. the automobile industry) exporters. But
beyond this, they cover quite well a large segment of the
spectrum of labour/human-capital intensive production process-
For overviews of Brazil's industrialization policies up
through 1980 see Tyler (1976 and 1981); for the period since
then see Fasano-Filho, Fischer, Nunnenkamp (1987).es beginning with the most labour intensive, i.e. the clothing
industry. Hence, they should capture equally well the differ-
entiated impact of policies affecting the labour market, par-
ticularly in light of the fact that shifts to capital/high-
technology intensive production methods are largely given in
the automobile but hardly in the clothing industry. Section V
then switches to the supply and quality of labour, reviewing
the policies enacted/prevailing, examining these vis-a-vis
Brazil's development path and its probable future course. In
the final Section VI conclusions are drawn as concerns tapping
Brazil's labour force potential and recommendations are made
regarding a more efficient structuring of labour markets.
II. Labour Market Trends in Brazil
The_Period_ug_to_the_^Secgnd_Oil_Shock"2_196 5-1980
On the whole, labour force developments in Brazil through the
end of the 70's portrayed an economy capable of absorbing
labour faster than the growth rate of the population. Not only
were new entrants finding jobs, but labour was also being
drawn out of unemployment or underemployment into better pay-
ing jobs and - in particular - the female labour force more
than doubled in the 15 year period from 1965-1980 (see Macedo,
pp. 4-5) . As can be seen from Table 1 , although Brazil was
not alone among the developing countries (DCs) increasing its
utilization of labour in this time period, it was ranked just
behind Taiwan, South Korea and Malaysia in its macro-economic
ability to expand the labour force at least as fast as the
population was growing (i.e. as can be seen when comparing the
In Tables 1 and 2 developments in Brazil are placed in an
international perspective by including data on the average
of all middle income developing countries, two other import-
ant Latin American countries (Colombia and Mexico) as well
as possible competitors in Asia (Malaysia, South Korea and
Taiwan) . While not all the figures in these two tables are
specifically mentioned in the text, the tables provide addi-
tional background information to allow readers to draw a
more complete picture of economic developments.1 2
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averages for Middle Income Countries.
terms. - while most of the series cover 1985, in some
that such minor distortions do not noticeably affect th
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Source: Excepting Taiwan either drawn or calculated from World Bank (1987) and IMF (1986) data. For Taiwan: CEPD (1986)
and Executive Yuan (1986).ratio between the labour force growth rate between 1965 and
19 80 and the population growth rate in the same period) . And
as a matter of fact, when comparing labour force growth with
the more relevant working-age population cohort (i.e. 15-64
years of age) Brazil's ability to create new jobs more rapidly
than the potential labour force was expanding, thus increasing
labour force participation, was just marginally surpassed by
just one other country, namely Mexico, in the initial time
period.
Examining Table 1 a little closer, it can be seen that Bra-
zil's labour market performance - even with higher than aver-
age inflation rates - was fueled from a broader expansion of
supply and/or demand-side factors than in the case of other
countries. Thus tapping the large domestic demand potential
(derived from a population around 120 million with a per ca-
pita income exceeding $ 2000/yr) plus export markets as well
as rapidly increasing investments by a similar rate opened up
job opportunities across sectors and - particularly important
in a vast country like Brazil - across regions. Jobs in the
manufacturing industry in the disadvantaged Northeast region,
for instance, increased in the last third of the 15 year per-
iod (i.e. 1975-1980) over 50% faster than those of the core
region (i.e. the Southeast) around Rio de Janeiro and Sao
Paulo (+36.8% vs. +23.7%: IBGE [1983], p. 483).
It is of course true that such differential regional growth
rates caused only a small reduction in the overpowering econo-
mic base of the Southeast: its share in manufacturing value
added dropped only 4 percentage points from 77% to 73% and in
manufacturing employment only 3 from 69% to 66% (IBGE [1983],
p. 483) . Nonetheless, it is also true that labour market de-
velopments in the Northeast reflected the exceptionally strong
demand for labour toward the end of the 70's and the attempts
to avoid labour shortages as well as large wage increases by
moving to disadvantaged areas where the labour market was not
as tight and where regional incentives were also offered. It
must be stressed, however, that the more rapid increase injobs in the Northeast, at least to the extent that they were
induced by incentives, also had its price: the cost per job
created amounted to $ 80,000 - $ 200,000 depending on assump-
tions made . Even if the lower estimate is used, when compared
with a per capita income in 1984 of $ 800 the inefficiency of
the incentives packages is quite obvious.
In addition to this locational mobility of firms to create
jobs in the Northeast, they also opted (at the same time)
across the entire economy more often for new or rather exten-
sive capital equipment to improve productivity and hence re-
duce the necessity to employ more labour (e.g. see Edwards).
This can be evidenced by the notable increases in average
productivity in the manufacturing and commerce/services sector
in the 70's as opposed to the earlier periods (Macedo, Table
2) . Coupled with this increase in the physical capital inten-
sity of production there was no doubt a concomitant upgrading
in skill levels through on-the-job-training and through in-
creased an outflow of students from educational facilities
beyond primary level (see Table 2).
Nonetheless, with respect to increasing human capital levels
Brazil lagged behind most other middle income DCs (see Table
2) . Particularly when compared with Asian competitors is the
difference quite considerable. As a matter of fact, the higher
the level of schooling, the greater the difference between
Brazil and countries like South Korea or Taiwan. Just as cha-
racteristic of the situation in Brazil is the development of
educational expenditures (as % of government expenditures, see
Table 2) , which have decreased considerably over time. It is
actually quite surprising to find out that out of 25 Latin
American countries Brazil's central government expenditure on
education (as % of GDP) is third from the bottom and less than
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Source: Excepting Taiwan based on various appendix tables in World Bank (1987), IMF (1986) and UNIDO (1986). For Taiwan:
CEPD (1986) and Executive Yuan (1986).one third the average (see IADB [1987], Table IV-6) . To what
extent this could prove to be a hindrance in connection with
tapping changing comparative advantages up the skill ladder is
an open question. It is of course true that policies did exist
in Brazil which allowed skills to be acquired and improved on-
the-job (on-the-job training: OJT) - a process which was even-
tually promoted through special tax treatment of training
expenditures. Nevertheless, over the years it became apparent
not only to firms demanding specific types of skilled labour
but also to the government that more effective efforts needed
to be taken to match the challenges of the future. Further-
more, technological advances were perceived as emerging at a
pace which could only be matched if the necessary foundations
for additional knowledge, i.e. beyond mere OJT-acquired
skills, had already become part of the human capital of those
involved. On top of this, that is in connection with govern-
ment policies (germinated toward the end of the 70 's) to di-
rect resources into the development and manufacturing of tech-
nically more sophisticated products, was the additional need
for measures aimed at increasing human capital levels.
The degree of urgency for such a program seemed to be more
than evident: by the end of the 70's Brazil was already a net
exporter of various manufactured items which were relatively
high-technology and/or human-capital intensive; among these
items were airplanes, electronic equipment, automobiles and
military hardware.
Despite the massive increase in the price of oil around the
turn of the decade and almost benignly ignoring the first wave
of DCs on the brink of heading into a "debt" crisis, Brazil
continued to adhere to expansionist policies (see e.g. Meyers,McCarthy) . Overall labour market developments thus initially
(i.e. well into 1980) hardly reflected the international dif-
ficulties already being foreshadowed elsewhere. However, as
inflation rates rapidly soared into the 3-digit range and a
greater recourse to foreign sources of capital seemed to be
inevitable, highly restrictive fiscal and monetary policies
were introduced in late 1980 (see Fasano-Filho, Fischer, Nun-
nenkamp, 1987). Their impact is only partially apparent in
Table 1, as through 1983 GDP/capita actually fell by an aver-
age of over 4%/year. On the other hand, the depth of the re-
cession and its impact on employment was felt most definitely
in manufacturing, where it dropped across the.board, in most
cases quite considerably (see Table Al).
In a broader context the severe recession in the early 1980"s
not only meant that employment levels were reduced, new en-
trants into the labour force could not find work either. With
a labour force of over 43 million in 1980 and growth rates of
the potential labour force running around 3%, 1.3 million new
entrants (on average) could be expected to offer their ser-
vices to the market every year in the first half of the 80's.
Despite the fact that the manufacturing sector accounted for
27% of the employment increase in the decade of the 70's,
services for almost 23% and agriculture actually contributing
a negative, albeit small amount (i.e. -3%), the "crisis years"
of the early 80's engendered a very different pattern in the
economy.
Whereas the increase in employment in the service sector tal-
lied to 29% of the total increase of 4.74 million persons in
GDP, for instance, increased in 1980 at the fastest rate
since 1976 (7.2% in real terms) and consumption as percent-
age of GDP remained in the early 80 's at the high level it
had jumped to in 1979 (79.8% vs. an average of 74.9% over
the previous 10 years [IMF, 1986, Tables 96 and 99]. See
also IADB (1980-81), pp. 187-189.the period 1981-84, the manufacturing industry was able to
account for a mere 7%. Agricultural employment on the other
hand, commanded over one third (i.e. 35%) of the total in-
crease in employment in this period, reversing thereby a down-
ward trend which could be observed over the last 3 decades .
Although industrial production recovered rapidly in 1984 and
19 85 corresponding changes in employment did not evolve. The
question about the reasons for and implications of these re-
cent trends must be posed.
III. Examining the Factors Shaping Labour Demand
Determinant s_of_the_pemand_for_Labour_:_the_UnderlYin2_Factors
Despite the fact that production patterns and hence employment
changes generally reflect the response of the economy to in-
come-induced changes in demand (or to exogenous shocks), long-
er term employment developments are determined by other, more
fundamental factors. That is, underlying and codetermining the
profile as well as the structure of changes in the demand for
and supply of labour in a market-oriented economy, in this
case Brazil, are basic shifts in the relevant economic para-
meters .
First of all, there are all those policies which impact upon
the demand for labour via measures influencing directly the
level of pay (i.e. minimum wages and wage policies) , hours/
days of work, working conditions, social benefits and job
termination. An overview of some of the more important meas-
ures prevailing in Brazil in the mid-1980's is presented -
together with other countries - in Table 3. Secondly, conco-
mitant to the above were manifold policies enacted and insti-
tuted by the Brazilian government to influence the structure
It is perhaps worthwhile to recall and contrast developments
after the second oil price shock with the reactions to the
first oil shock in 1973, in the course of which employment
and output in the industrial sector maintained their above
average growth rates. See, e.g. Meyers, McCarthy, pp. 5-8.10
of the economy and the structure of the production process
(e.g. investment and export incentives). One direct result of
these measures or rather of the rapid growth of various non-
traditional industries created thereby, was a large and con-
tinually expanding demand for specific types of skilled la-
bour .
The consequence of the interaction between these two points is
quite straightforward- in an economy (like Brazil) where the
relative prices of the factors of production determine the
degree to which these factors are employed in the production
process. In the context of the following analysis, which fo-
cusses on the impact of labour market policies on the demand
for and supply of labour, the price of labour as a factor of
production became - due to policies touched on in Table 3 and
expounded upon below - relatively more expensive vis-a-vis
other factors of production, i.e. human capital and physical
capital. Under such conditions (and excluding policies causing
prices of the other factors of production to increase by simi-
lar amounts) it can be assumed that entrepreneurs will react
by increasing investment in more physical capital equipment as
well as in more human capital production methods. While the
former could well embody deskilling in addition to substitut-
ing physical capital for labour, the latter implies more qua-
lified, but fewer employees (probably) coupled with more phy-
sical capital .
While this paper only examines the issues on a macro- or
sectoral level, the author realizes that the location of
many of the new industries in or near the large conurbations
tended to amplify the attractiveness of such areas, inducing
thereby urban or regional problems not expounded upon in
this analysis.
2
Further reinforcing policies which tend to promote the sub-
stitution of capital for the existence of unions, i.e. at
least to the degree to which they succeed in inducing entre-
preneurs to effectively remunerate at rates beyond producti-
vity levels. Given the fact that trade unions have become
increasingly active or rather even militant in Brazil since
the end of the 70's, their impact cannot be overlooked. To
deal with them more specifically, however, goes beyond the
author's brief or rather the intent of this paper.11
i§2H£__yPutting_Brazil into_International
Perspective
Returning now to the issue of specific labour market policies
in Brazil, it must be considered as being similar to most
other Latin American countries and quite different from Asian
countries; this at least is the picture which can be developed
from Table 3 . It is perhaps best characterized as being in-
2
terventionist . Generally speaking, not only does a highly
complex Labour Code (LC) exist to generally structure rela-
tionships between'employees and employers, but minimum wages
and executive decrees directly influence wage levels through-
out the economy.
However, before examining in greater detail specific policies
in Brazil which influenced the price of labour, a closer ana-
lysis of Table 3 helps to place Brazil's international compe-
titive position with respect to tapping its abundant supply of
labour into a better perspective.
Minimum wages: While the information contained in this
column shows that Brazil has minimum wages and adjusts them
quite frequently, it unfortunately does not adequately
portray the real impact of wage floors. First of all, it is
not known to what extent minimum wage levels are relevant
for a significant number of the labour force covered by
such legislation. In the case of Brazil, for instance, over
55% of the employed persons in 1984 earned less than two
minimum wage rates (IBGE, 1985). Indications are that, when
Table 3 covers other important countries in South America
and Asia (either because they are competitors or have ef-
fected policies of particular interest here). Since the
table is meant to be brief but informative, not all details
of certain measures could be presented. See also Salowsky
(1985).
2
For an overview of developments in labour market law in
Brazil see Sussekind (1985) ; for the prevailing relevant
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Abbreviations used: M = month/monthly; lirs. = hours; D(s) = day(s)/daily; OT = overtime; S+H = Sundays and holidays; C = calendar; yr. = year
Note: Information in this table was culled from various sources. While every attempt was made to ensure that the information is comparable, conflicting or differing
statements meant decisions had to be made in one direction or another without knowing which was correct.
aAlthough this information applies to the primary textile industry (derived from Werner [1986]) it can be generally assumed to roughly reflect the relative labor
market conditions between the countries.
Source: Business International (August 11, 1986); Neundorfer, Stahr (1985); Deloitte, Haskins, Sells (various years); Campbell (1985); Werner (1986).Bibliothek
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compared with the other Latin American countries, this
share for Brazil is relatively high. Thus increasing mini-
mum wages in Brazil will have a greater immediate influence
on costs and in the longer run on the demand for labour.
Secondly, neither the degree of coverage (i.e. % of employ-
ed) is known nor is there an indication of the extent to
which the legislation is enforced. In the latter case the
importance of the public sector and the organized private
sector as well as the strength of unions, the size of firms
and distance from administrative centers all play signifi-
cant roles.
While - generally speaking - countries have been easing up
on the application of minimum wages in recent years, in
particular through letting inflation erode the relative
height of the wage floors, Brazil (as will be shown) actu-
ally increased its activities over the last decade in in-
dexing minimum wages/wages to inflation rates. For compari-
son's sake: Taiwan can be considered as lying on the other
end of the spectrum, with minimum wages not being adjusted
for periods of many years and their relevance for wage
levels (i.e. for a sizeable share of the wage earners)
being quite small.
Working hours/overtime; The ability to smoothly adjust
production schedules in line with market demand factors is
an essential ingredient in remaining competitive in an
outward and market-oriented economy. Given the all-encom-
passing approach of many Latin American labour codes, this
has led to large disincentives being created which work
against multiple shift operations, as well as overtime, by
making them more expensive. For instance, in the case of
shift work and overtime regulations have been instituted to
"protect" employees (e.g. prohibition of females working at
night), but in reality they often lead to increased invest-
ment in capital equipment and thus end up causing fewer
jobs to be created for those who was supposed to be pro-14
tected. Colombia is often considered as being particularly
adept among the Latin American countries in imposing such
disincentives (e.g. wage premiums must already be paid
beginning at 6:00 P.M.), Brazil (in a sample of nine devel-
oping countries from around the world) was second to. last
(India was last) with respect to labour flexibility (see
E.M.F. [1986], p. 121).
Perhaps also indicative of the flexibility with which the
factors of production (i.e. labour and capital together)
can used is the number of days/year which production lines
(i.e. mill operation) can be run. Brazil's position vis-a"-
vis the other Latin American countries in Table 3 is mid-
field, with Argentina and Peru below it but Colombia and
Mexico above it. Again, when compared with the Asian compe-r
titors, especially Taiwan, the difference is considerable.
Vacation/bonuses: After taking everything, into considerar-
tion Brazil's normal working days/year amount to 9 more
than the lowest number listed (i.e. Argentina), but 17 less
than its most industrious Latin American competitor (Mexi-
co) and 72 less than Taiwan. A more characteristic differ-
ence between Latin America and Asia is the treatment of
bonuses: Whereas in LA they are essentially seen as being
part of the wages (as dictated by labour codes) , in Asia
they are treated as something which must be strived for,
i.e. they tend to be paid in accordance with the profita-
bility of the company. •15
Job termination: Regulations governing the conditions under
which employment contracts can be terminated are (probably)
as important for employers as those which govern direct
wage costs and flexibility. Although definitive cross coun-
try information on this topic is missing, substantiation of
this claim is drawn from two sources. First of all, in a
survey of companies in a country with extremely restrictive
termination and wage flexibility regulations (i.e. Panama;
see Spinanger [1984], pp. 19 and 20), the conditions sur-
rounding employment contracts were listed as causing the
most difficulties for employers in connection with the
Labor Code (mentioned by 31% of the 54 firms answering) .
However, when expressed in terms of costs involved, termi-
nation conditions were roughly 200% more costly than those
2
stemming from union or wage flexibility reasons . Secondly
in an ongoing study on barriers to entry in the Caribbean
Basin, companies expressing interest in certain countries
have stressed the importance of employment contract flexi-
bility in making their investment decisions. It can thus
hardly be surprising that Panama is one of those countries
which has attracted relatively little foreign direct in-
vestment.
Union related Labor Code problems accounted for 27% and wage
2 costs/inflexibility for 24%.
Wage cost reductions were estimated to amount to 32% if
employment contract conditions were liberalized. Changes in
regulations vis-a-vis unions or wage flexibility would re-
sult in wage costs being reduced by only 11% in each case
(Spinanger, 1984, p. 20).16
Brazil's relative position with respect to job termination
in Latin America is one which - when based on Table 3 would
seem to be fairly liberal - actually. seems to be tending
toward being one of the more restrictive countries on the
continent. Not only are labour courts and union activities
making it more difficult or at least more expensive to
terminate contracts (see Macedo, p. 45), the initial propo-
sals for the new constitution incorporate ideas of perma-
nent job security. Should such proposals indeed become law,
then Brazil would move up toward a level similar to Peru's
(or Panama's), where termination of employment contracts is
extremely difficult or rather very expensive. The impact in
Brazil, however, would be far more severe than in Peru, as
the formal sector in Brazil accounts for roughly two thirds
of the labour force (see e.g. IADB [1987], pp. 124-127),
but for only 10% in Peru (see Carbonetto [1986], section
2.6)
1.
Relative to the Asian countries none of the Latin American
countries can measure up to them with respect to flexible
job termination. Although often referred, to as "hire and
fire" principles, evidence from the Asian countries points
in the opposite direction and even reveals a remarkably
stable labour force and a long-time attachment to the indi-
vidual companies (see e.g. Galenson [1979], p. 410 and pp.
434-435) "given satisfactory productivity levels".
It might be noted that in Panama, following the introduction
of the Labor Code in 1972, 75% of the employment increases
through the mid 1980's were in the government sector. In
other words the private sector found it too risky to employ
additional workers, who might be very expensive and diffi-
cult - to release at a later point in time. Needless to say,
the informal, increased as well, as could be evidenced by a
sizeable reduction in labour force participation rates.17
Nonwage labour costs; With respect to Brazil's internatio-
nal competitive position the data on nonwage labour costs
would seem to be more conclusive than those in the other
columns: Brazil leads the Latin American countries listed
in Table 3 and is multiples ahead of the Asian, countries..
In particular the increased activities of unions since the
early 80's (see Macedo [1986], p. 45) has resulted in
stronger demands being placed on employers for additional
fringe benefits. Since there is little evidence that this
trend is tapering off and with government bodies tending to
support additional social legislation in times of "crisis"-
induced difficulties, the pressure to further increase
nonwage labour costs would seem quite strong. Among the
other Latin American countries perhaps only in Peru would
the pressures also seem to be as strong, although - as
noted above - they would only affect about 10% of the la-
bour force there.
While these various pieces of information on nonwage labour
costs must be evaluated together with specific wage and
productivity levels in order to compute and compare actual
per unit output costs. They do tend to impact in the same
direction as many of the points mentioned earlier. Further-
more, knowing that ratings of vocational training as well
as the quality and quantity of skilled labour are very low
(EMF [1986], p. 155) , the factors working against improv-
ing Brazil's competitive position are quite evident.
Labour Market_Interventions in Brazil: the
Prevailing Policies
In summarizing the above it can stated that labour market
interventions in Brazil are ubiquitous and in many cases have
been expanded upon in recent years. In the most straightfor-
Out of the 9 developing countries in the survey Brazil was
ranked 7th in vocational training (tied with India but ahead
of Mexico), 8th in quality of skilled labour (tied with
Mexico) and 9th in quantity of skilled labour.18
ward attempt to influence the price of labour, i.e. in the
case of minimum wages, the Brazilian government actually went
to great lengths over the 15 years prior to 1980 to refine
minimum wage and wage policies, particularly in accordance
with price stabilization (see Carvalho, p. 109-110) . In 1979,
2
however, basic changes were enacted in these wage policies ,
which still permeate prevailing policies in the mid 80 's.
Among other things these led to a differentiated impact on
companies disaggregated by size and sector (see Table 4) .
Since this set-up means that those on the lower end of the pay
scale (as measured in multiples of minimum wage levels) re-
ceive a far greater compensation for inflation, the implica-
tions over a longer period of time are quite clear: it de-
creases the demand for low-wage workers and leads all the more
to capital intensive investment - particularly in the smaller
size establishments - the smaller the possibility to pass on
the wage increases.
While further changes in the system of adjusting minimum wages
and wages were instituted during the early 80's they did noth-
ing to rectify the "advantage" low-wage, i.e. low-skilled,
workers were given by being compensated for up to 110% of
inflation (i.e. for the cohort up to a wage equivalent to 3
The basic principles up through 1979 stipulated wage adjust-
ments at best yearly, based on real wages two years past,
and took productivity increases and projected inflation
rates into consideration. The changes made from the mid 60's
through 1979 reflected prevailing economic concerns (see
Carvalho, p. 113); i.e., during the initial period (i.e.
through 1968) coverage was broadened and consolidated; then
correction made for underestimating inflation (1968-74),
emphasizing income distribution aspects (1974-76) and taking
into account more rapidly accelerating inflation (1976-79)
2
Base reference period was shortened from 24 to 6 months,
wage adjustments tapered off according to multiples of mini-
mum wage rates and differentiated productivity-rate induced
wage increases permitted, whereby such increases could not
be passed on in higher prices.- 19 -
Table 4 - Impact of Wage Adjustments on Payrolls by Establishment Size and Sector












































































size represent the specific
change relative to the change for the entire sector. Hence, for Wage Policy I, estab-
lishment size 0-5 and Total Industry wages changed by 3.
where they actually changed by 1.035







of wage adjustments made to
those earning more than 15 times minimum wage; i.e. the wage of this group increased
relatively slower when compared with those below it. See
127) for more detailed explanations.
text or Carvalho (pp. 116-
Source: Own calculations based on Carvalho (Tables 3,4,8 and 9).20
minimum wages). Since the relative price of low-skilled labour
vis-a-vis higher skilled (e.g. wages equivalent to 15-20 times
minimum wages were given only a 50% compensation for infla-
tion) increased considerably, rational economic behaviour
would dictate that firms restructure production processes to
substitute more of the latter for the former. Perhaps because
such substitution processes could be observed, but also be-
cause stabilization attempts were being virtually destroyed by
the impact of large (nominal) exchange rate devaluations
quickly working their way through the economy , revisions were
made in 1983 (November)
2, 1984 (October) and 1985 (December)
which finally did eliminate the discriminatory impact on the
demand for low-wage labour (see e.g. Baer [1987], Despite this
last change (i.e. the last one prior to the Cruzado Plan in
1986, which is not dealt with here; see Fischer [1986], for a
concise and illuminating resume) it probably came too late
for damage (i.e. lower employment levels) to be undone. In
order to determine whether the demand for low-wage/low-skilled
labour was actually negatively affected by the wage policies
within the framework of the other labour market policies men-
tioned above, two sets of data will be examined - first on a
micro-level and then on a macro-level.
From December 1982 to December 1983 the cruzeiro decreased
in value by almost 75%.
2
Most importantly, the compensation of 110% of inflation for
the lowest wage strata was reduced to 80%. For the wage
strata between 3 and 15 minimum wage rates a sliding scale
down to a 50% compensation for inflation was introduced;
beyond 15 minimum wage rates 50% compensation prevailed.
Led to a system where the six-month inflation adjustment
amounted to 100% for all salaries up to 10 times the minimum
wage rate and 80% for all those above this level .Further
stipulation for the higher wage strata allow for additional
increases (via negotiations between employers and employees)
up to 20% of the increase of the official price index. All
salary strata are entitled to productivity-based pay in-
creases, determined by job classification but limited to in-
creases of GDP/capita.21
Based on the micro-data, provided by one of the major produc-
ers of transport equipment in Brazil, precisely such a hypo-
thesized shift can be observed (Table 5), whereby part of the
shift is also reflected in the substitution of salary for wage
earners (i.e. white collar for blue collar) . Looking at the
evidence reveals the fact that minimum wages were increasing
at an annual rate of 143% over the period 1979-1985, while
average wages increased by 135%/year. Furthermore, prices for
substitute factors of production, e.g. investment goods, were
increasing by 139%/year (based on price index for machinery,
vehicles and equipment) and 124%/year for buildings (in Sao
Paulo). Given negative interest rates and investment incent-
ives (as mentioned above) which cheapened capital investments
even more, the economic necessity to replace low-paid/low-
skilled workers with higher skilled workers - in order to
remain competitive - is quite apparent.
But even on a macro-level (Table 6) it can be seen that in the
period 1981-84 - in other words in the recession - employment
in higher-paid/higher-skilled jobs increased, as could be
expected given the assumed impact of the above measures (cete-
ris paribus): the changes were inversely correlated with as-
cending wage strata. That such trends did not show up in the
two years during which the above measures were instituted and
just leading into the recession (1979-81) cannot only be at-
tributed to above described wage policies not having time to
fully "bite"; they were also no d cubt c ainterbalanced partly
by buoyant demand, so that wage increases could be easily
passed on.
The author does not want to contend that the entire shift is
due to policy measures, since an economy in the course of
development is always in the process of becoming more skill
intensive once surplus labour supplies have been exhausted
and more productive labour must be drawn on.
2
It might be noted that a yearly increase of 139% over 6
years means a total change by a factor of 186, whereas 143%/
year over the same time period results in a total change by
a factor of 206.22
Table 5 - Structure of Employment by Wage Strata as well as by Wage (w)
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Source: Own calculations based on confidential information from a large
transportation equipment manufacturer in Brazil.
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Source: Own calculations based on data from IBGE (1986), p. 667.23
It is perhaps worthwhile recalling in connection with this
negative impact of minimum wages and wage policies on the
employment of low-wage/low-skilled workers (i.e. the working
poor), that during the 50's in Brazil real minimum wages ex-
panded rapidly, but at the same time employment grew slowly
and was concentrated in low-productivity areas. In the 10 year
period beginning in the mid-60's, however, real minimum wages
decreased noticeably, but were accompanied by strong employ-
ment growth rates (see Morley, p. 255-259) . As Morley con-
cludes (p. 259) : "Over time, economic growth and the govern-
mental policy of holding down the minimum wage have led to a
large increase for below-minimum-wage workers in agriculture,
and the rapid flow of workers into urban jobs at or above the
minimum wage. Both of the tendencies favor the working poor".
Although the relevance of Brazil's earlier experience for the
labour market in the first half of the 80's can hardly be
overlooked, the enactment of the above policies attest to the
above mentioned influence of political pressure groups on
economic policy prevailing over experience from the recent
past or rather over fundamental economic knowledge.
IV. Examining the Specific Impact of Labour Market Policies;
the Case of the Clothing and Automobile Industry
Beyond the negative employment impact for low-skilled workers,
the question of a misallocation of resources and the evolving
damage to Brazil's competitive position has yet to be assess-
ed. After all, the majority of workers employed in the manu-
facturing industry was earning wages just a few multiples of
minimum wage levels. A glance at Appendix-Table A2, which
portrays the situation at a time before major shifts were
induced by wage policies, underlines this point. Particularly
in the highly lab car-intensive clothing, footwear, and soft-
goods industry is the concentration in the initial wage
stratum very high (89%) . But even in the motor vehicles in-
dustry the wage concentration at the lower end of the scale
(i.e. up to 3 minimum wage rates) was almost 50%.24
Since it was already shown above that for the automobile in-
dustry (at least for large motor vehicle producers) a notice-
able shift towards higher wage/skill levels was at least part-
ly the result of increasing the relative price of low-wage/
skill labour, it could logically be assumed that the same
reaction would occur in a highly labour-intensive industry
like clothing. There is, however, a difference: namely in
those industries where the production possibility spectrum
incorporates but little latitude to accommodate major shifts
in the relative utilization of physical and/or human-capital
factors of production vis-a-vis labour, changes in relative
factor prices can hardly induce the required amount of sub-
stitution in order to increase productivity accordingly.
The clothing industry is such a case and a review of techno-
logy changes in this industry shows- that they have been slow
to come about and - as opposed to the textile industry - do
not embody recent major shifts to permit wide-scale replace-
ment of labour inputs by capital equipment. As a matter of
fact, in the core production process, sewing, techniques do
not basically differ from those which prevailed following the
integration of the sewing machine into the production process
during the course of the last century . The basic reason for
this is the nature of the production process itself, where two
dimensional materials (i.e. cloth) of non-stiff or rather
soft/limp nature are subjected to a series of individual la-
bour-intensive handling/assembly steps. While some steps up-
stream from sewing (e.g. designing and cutting) or rather some
particular clothes (e.g. jeans) have been adapted to more
capital-intensive methods, basically the entire process has
remained disjointed and labour-intensive with over 80% of the
The labour-intensive character of the process back then
still dominates and in hardly any other major industry are
labour inputs coupled with such small amounts of physical
capital equipment as in the clothing industry.25
Table 7 - Development of Real Minimum Wages and Export Per-
formance of the Clothing Industry: 1965-1983
1965 1973 1980 1983 1985
% Change in real
minimum wages
Rank in world cloth-
ing exports
-15.9 12.5 3.7 -4.4
46 25 34 38 40
Highest minimum wage rate in Sao Paulo deflated by consumer
price index from Rio de Janeiro. For the yeans 1980, 1983 and
19 85 average of 2 prevailing rates taken. - Brazil's ranking
in clothing exports among
tries.
60 developing and developed coun-
Source: For real minimum wages: Own calculations based on
IBGE (1986), Table 1, p. 666 and IBGE (1983), Table
1, p. 706. For trade: Own calculations based on
unpublished UNCTAD data.
employees (i.e. those with low-skill levels) concentrated in
the sewing process.
Given the above constellation it is understandable that poli-
cies which force up the price of low-skilled labour will quite
directly induce price increases in final clothing products.
The ramifications for world market competitiveness are ob-
vious. It can thus hardly be surprising to determine that
Brazil's clothing industry performance in world markets coin-
cides quite well with the degree to which wage policies were
strictly or less strictly enforced. This is shown in Table 8,
whereby the strictness of enforcement is assumed to be ex-
pressed in the change in real minimum wages. That is - gener-
ally speaking - when minimum wages were increased by less
(more) than inflation rates the ranking in world clothing
exports improved (worsened).26
As opposed to the clothing industry the production process in
the automobile industry is quite adaptable to incorporating
more physical and human capital manufacturing techniques. Thus
the reaction of the automobile industry to changing relative
factor prices (e.g. due to minimum wage policies), increased
union militancy and tighter labour code restrictions was
steered all the more in the direction of increasing the phy-
sical and human capital intensity of production by the onset
of microelectronics. Across the entire spectrum of automobile
companies in Brazil the incorporation and/or adaptation of
microelectronic technology was viewed as essential to remain
competitive. In some cases it was also considered necessary in
connection with global strategies embodying the concept of a
world car and placing demands on production facilities which
could only be met by installing automated production/assembly
technologies.
Given the intent to remain competitive in world markets the
inroads made by microelectronics into the Brazilian automobile
industry to date must still be interpreted as representing
just a small fraction of what could happen if labour cost
parameters were to dramatically increase. Aside from the above
mentioned quality-control reasons behind automation, the sub-
stitution potential embodied in flexible, automated production
processes has hardly been tapped in Brazil . Instead, basic-
ally dedicated automated equipment together with labour inputs
have been opted for. That is, although the equipment and ma-
chines are operationally similar to those in ICs, they are
only integrated into subproduction processes within specific
work areas (e.g. painting, welding, etc.). Given the ability
to draw on a relatively large reservoir of unskilled, but
trainable labour, selecting this path can be considered as an
efficient solution and hence helps maintain a competitive
stance in world markets.
This evidence has been gathered from discussions carried out
with various automobile firms in Brazil.27
Initial steps off this path have no doubt already been taken
in connection with the major reequipment and reorganization
investments made by VW, Ford and GM in the first half of the
1980's (see Peliano, p. 7). With non-wage labour costs in-
creasing more rapidly than wages and e.g. already amounting to
156% of wages and salaries at VW in 1982 (vis-a-vis 137% in
1 2
1978) , additional investments are sure to. follow . They im-
ply, of course, that the qualification level of employees will
See Doleschal (p. 128). Whereas total wages and salaries at
VW do Brasil increased by a factor of 11.8 in the period
1978-1982, non-wage labour costs increased by a factor of
13.5. The largest subgroups therein (legal and voluntary
social benefits, 29% of all labour costs in 1982) actually
increased by a factor of 14.9.
2
As important as labour cost developments are for the analy-
sis of the international competitive position of a given
industry, consistant and accurate information on non-wage
labour costs across countries are hard to come by. Should
the reader be familiar with international comparisons the
above mentioned figure for VW will be surprisingly high.
However, it is further substantiated by confidential data
provided by other major motor vehicle manufacturers in Bra-
zil. In noting what other sources state, Picht (1987, Table
A4) , for instance, draws on data from the US Bureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS) which shows that Brazil' s motor vehicle
industry incurs non-wage labour costs amounting to an addi-
tional 36.7% of average hourly earnings in 1983. This same
source shows that this figure holds for 1985 as well and is
hardly different than the 35.6% for 1975. As mentioned in
the technical notes these figures for average hourly earn-
ings include in many cases additional wage/non-wage costs;
the BLS thus specifically states that the ratio of additio-
nal non-wage labour costs to hourly wages "should not be
used for intercountry comparison of * fringe benefit' ra-
tios. " (underlined in original source; BLS (1986), Appendix,
p. 2) .
Another example: Werner International, a consulting firm
specializing in the textile industry, publishes labour cost
information on a continual, consistant and comparable basis.
It calculated for the Brazilian textile (together with other
countries) ratios of 81% for 1980 (38 countries; spring) and
107% for 1985/86 (51 countries; winter). Both the level and
increase of this ratio reflect to a greater degree the auto-
mobile industry trends mentioned above. It is assumed that
such figures are adequate ballpark estimates of levels and
trends of non-wage labour costs in Brazil' s manufacturing
industry and subsectors therein.28
have to increase (deskilling is not assumed to occur) not only
as concerns operations, but in particular with respect to
attempting to achieve a maximum utilization of the productivi-
ty potential such technologies embody (see Section IV on
skills). Despite having to pay higher wages for the more
skilled workers, these expenses will be considerably less than
the labour-input savings induced by the automation. First of
all, already within the relatively inflexible set-up prevail-
ing in Brazilian plant labour inputs have been estimated to be
reduced by 15-20% (e.g. in the soldering, tinkering and paint-
ing areas; see Peliano, p. 13) . Secondly, in the case of
numerically controlled machine tools it was determined that a
new machine replaced (on average) 3-5 convential ones. On a
two shift basis this means that 4-8 workers/machine are re-
placed (Tauile, p. 22), although additional jobs are created
off the production line.
Aside from the negative feedback from the protectionist poli-
cies mentioned above (i.e. in the preceeding footnote), there
is also a certain amount of hesitancy on the part of some
firms to invest in new automated equipment imagining how
unions will react and knowing how costly releasing employees
can be. Nonetheless: the fact that greater efforts have not
been made to date to ensure that labour is quickly replaced by
more automated techniques would seem to point to utilization
of standard methods to reduce labour costs. As a matter of
fact, in a survey of 5 Brazilian motor vehicle producers (i.e.
4 automobile assemblers and 1 truck assembler) carried out in
Standing in the way of installing more and better automated
equipment are Brazil's own import substitution policies. Thus,
to the extent that domestically produced equipment is available
it can cost several times the price for a similar piece on
world markets. Furthermore, there is a hesitancy to purchase
hardware and software from companies, whose experience in the
field has been brief. Importing the equipment is another op-
tion, but this path is costly due to tariffs and the surtax
(i.e. financial operation tax); the latter alone approaches 50%
of the imported price.29
1984, the reduction of labour costs was not mentioned as a
main argument for introducing microelectronic technology
(Tauile, p. 12). A caveat would nonetheless seem to be called
for in connection with the seemingly straightforward results
of this survey: while labour costs may not be explicitly me-
ntioned in the reasons given, they are nonetheless implicit in
a number of them .
Whatever, the demand for higher skilled employees will be
increasing in the coming years all the faster, the greater the
labour market has been cleared of unskilled workers or rather
the stronger the demand for the non-traditional or the high-
tech import substituting/export diversification industries is.
As was already seen in the late 70's and even again in 1985
when the economy was rapidly expanding it showed signs of
developing bottlenecks vis-a-vis the supply of skilled labour.
Having dealt with factors affecting the demand for labour, the
2
supply side now needs to be examined .
The main reasons given in order of importance (Tauile, p.
12) :
1. Greater flexibility in production facilities;
2. Better quality and more strict quality control;
3. Better control of production flows;
4. Better working environment including safety.
5. Speed-up of production (productivity).
2
Without going any further into the factor intensity impact
of Brazilian industrialization and export incentive poli-
cies, it must suffice within the context of this paper to
note that they have tended to embody a bias towards more
capital intensive methods of production. To be specific:
subsidies were granted on credit, tax and import duties were
reduced or waived on capital equipment and exports actually
induced cash payments by the government. As mentioned ear-
lier, regional incentives also existed and they had - at
least in the Northeast - an extremely capital intensive
impact.30
V. Influencing the Quality of Labour in Brazil; an Overview of
Vocational and Educational Policies
Despite the fact that - on average - unskilled versus skilled
workers have profitted from a more rapid increase in wages
since the mid 70
fs (see Diagram 1), certain, particularly
high-skilled occupations continued to command large or even
increasing wage differentials. For instance, telecom equipment
repairmen received almost 80% more (on average in 1983) than
auto mechanics (Ministerio de Trabalho, pp. 205, 235). Such
evidence that the supply of key skilled workers was (and still
is) below levels in line with the demand evolving from the
growing non-traditional industries, was backed up by reports
of both personnel managers as well those employment agencies
responsible for providing such workers (see also international
overview above). Given the future potential demand for skilled
personnel derived not only from changing technologies in
existing industries, for instance mentioned above in connec-
tion with the automobile industry, but especially engendered
by the so-called "technologias de punta" , the skill level of
2 the Brazilian labour force will need considerable upgrading .
See e.g., SENAI, I Piano Nacional de Desenvolvimento da Nova
Republica, 1986-1989. With such skilled personnel Brazil ex-
pects to be able to expand manufactured exports into new, non-
traditional areas, such as digitally controlled machine tools,
laser technology, robotics and biogenetics.
2
As Morley (p. 219-220) notes that when compared across coun-
tries Brazil has fewer technicians and more administrative/
managerial personnel than could be expected for a country with
its attributes. Although the manufacturing industry appears to
be more skill intensive than average, this is due to its sub-
sectors being skill intensive, not to skill intensive subsec-
tors being over represented. Reformulated: Brazil approaches
international standards of skill intensity only as regards its
manufacturing sector, and this is due to owner-operators rather
than engineers, scientists and other technicians.Diagram 1 - Index of Wage Differentials between Skilled and Unskilled Workers
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1Calculated as ratio of wage index for skilled workers to wage index for unskilled
workers.
Source: Excerpted from Macedo, who notes that data was originally drawn from a series
of wage surveys (manufacturing sector) carried out by PRIL, a consulting firm
in the area of personnel and wage administration in the city of Sao Paulo. The
series were assembled by Domingo Z. Ocio and presented in his Remuneracao do
Trabalho na Economia Brasileira nas Decadas de Sessenta e Setenta, unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation. Getulio Vargas Foundation School of Business Administration,
Sao Paulo (July, 1985).32
The task Brazil faces in this respect is formidable, as over
1.2 million persons yearly are entering the labour force in
the 1980s looking for jobs, not counting therein those who
lost their jobs in the recession lasting through 1984.
Based on the skill structure of the labour force as it evolved
during economic growth throughout the 1970's it has been esti-
mated by the World Bank that through the 1980's skilled blue
and white collars jobs will grow at rates exceeding the aver-
age rate of employment growth by 50% and 100% respectively.
Assuming that employment expands in line with the growth rate
of the potential labour force this means that about 400,000
additional jobs for skilled workers and technicians will have
been created by 1990.
To address the basic issue of technical and vocational educa-
tion the government of Brazil had undertaken little through
1975. Non-formal training was assumed to be the responsibility
of private enterprises or was offered through various publicly
supported, semi-autonomous organizations like The National
Service for Industrial Apprenticeship (SENAI) and the National
Service for Commercial Apprenticeship (SENAC), which were
funded by a 1% payroll tax. Formal technical training, on the
other hand, was run through the Ministry of Education via
secondary and post secondary training at federally supported
technical schools. It might be added that general secondary
education did not usually incorporate vocationally oriented
curricula up to the 70's.
The obvious inadequacies of this hodge-podge of institutions
for the type of development Brazil already foresaw back in the
60 's had been recognized and in 1971 a major educational re-
form was effected to attempt to more efficiently and effec-
tively allow for the necessary human-capital to be created. On
the organizational side, this first entailed spinning off the
Ministry of Labor from the Ministry of Labor and Social Wei-33
fare and empowering it to oversee labour relations, wages and
employment, including non-formal vocational training. Later,
in 1976, the National Vocational Training System (NVTS) was
created as an umbrella institution for all vocational training
programs in Brazil and itself placed under the control of the
newly created Federal Manpower Council (CFMO).
Moving from this brief organizational overview to the actual
policies which evolved therefrom, Brazil enacted a key measure
in 1975 aimed at harnessing the potential of the private sec-
tor in helping to train the labour force. The measure (still
in effect), provides (as noted earlier on p. 5) a financial
incentive to firms training their own employees. Specifically,
it permits corporate entities - having received explicit ap-
proval from the Ministry of Labour - to deduct from pretax
income 200% of expenditures made for training employees. Al-
though such deductions cannot exceed 10% of taxable profits in
any one year, any excess can be carried forward three years.
The fact that by the mid-1980s almost 3400 enterprises were
providing training for roughly two million employees annually
would seem to attest to the wide acceptance of this scheme.
The immediate impact of this measure on the willingness of
entrepreneurs to employ and train more individuals can be
considered to straightforward, at least to the extent that a
company does not come up against the 10% constraint or is not
making profits : wage costs during the training period are
essentially reduced by the prevailing marginal corporate tax
rate. Assuming the highest corporate income tax rate in Brazil
to be applicable, then wage costs are reduced by 45% (50% for
financial institutions) , an amount which could very well act
as an incentive to train. This incentive - at least potential-
In a highly inflationary economy like Brazil the carrying for-
ward of expenses from one year (tax period) to the next will
produce results equivalent to deductions effected in the cur-
rent period only if those expenses carried forward can be ap-
propriately inflated and opportunity costs are also accounted
for.34
ly - can be viewed as covering the time period during which OJT
or learning-by-doing means that - given a relatively inflexible,
lab cur-code structured wage system - entrepreneurs may otherwise
have to remunerate workers initially with wage rates/salaries in
excess to what the workers actually produce. As a consequence the
more-experienced may end up receiving less than what they earn if
paid according to their performance. The additional 100% deduc-
tion of training costs thus could allow firms to compensate for
the low output to labour cost ratio of new employees and perhaps
also permit pay upgrades to be effected for those whose output to
labour cost ratio was considerably greater than 1.
Of course, the actual existence of such seemingly attractive
training incentives means little if
(a) no approval is given by the Ministry of Labour, because
: . it deems that the given project does not fit into Bra-
zil's overall development plans;
(b) the lack of space and/or infrastructure a firm has to
offer is not considered to be adequate for the training
purposes.
While (b) could be considered as representing a (desirable)
quality control mechanism, (a) implies that the State knows
more about what the future holds than private entrepreneurs.
Since the latter has never been shown to hold true, such in-
terventions at best dampen the entrepreneurs' willingness to
invest (i.e. take risks) . Even worse, they could lead to in-
vestments being made primarily in areas selected by the State,
based on principles removed from those centered around the
functioning of the price system (coupled with an entrepreneu-
rial spirit).
See Doing Business in Brazil, p. 104, Section 14.106.35
It should also be pointed ait, first of all, that the job
training measure puts larger firms, i.e. those with sufficient
infrastructure facilities and qualified instructors, at a di-
stinct advantage over smaller firms. Although partial rectifi-
cation of this is achieved by the possibility of contracting
with public institutions (e.g. SENAI) or even private con-
tractors to provide the necessary facilities and personnel,
the effectiveness of such courses depends on the ability to
duplicate cutside the company the demands placed on an em-
ployee by a firm's individual production parameters.
Secondly, the incentive structure of the training measure
(i.e. allowing expenses only to be deducted from pretax pro-
fits and limiting these to 10% of pretax profits) obviously
meant that the more profitable a company is (at least up to
the 10% limit), the greater the amount which can be allocated
to improving productivity. Assuming that the training programs
actually do lead to higher productivity levels and hence to
stronger competitive positions, then this incentive promotes
the successful companies. Aside from serving as an accelerator
to a Darwinian type of economic selection process, this in-
centive could be considered as distributing subsidies in a
relatively efficient manner.
And what about the overall impact in terms of public vs. pri-
vate welfare benefits? Since most firms are interested in
investing in specific as opposed to general training programs,
so they alone can profit from the training efforts invested,
the direct welfare gains will accrue more on a private than
social level. On the other hand to the extent that internatio-
nal competitive positions are improved and thus more exports
sold, higher income levels, ergo higher welfare levels are
induced. What is nonetheless quite probably lacking in connec-
tion with tapping the private sector's ability to efficiently
and effectively provide training service is simply the embedd-
ing of vocational training into a better structured, overall36
educational system. For sure, through such an interface Brazil
would be able to more easily master the faster pace with which
technologies are now and will be changing.
Is there any evidence that this subsidization of training
programs for 2 million persons a year is generating more pro-
ductive employees and hence increasing the competitive posi-
tion of? the firms for which they work? With the program in
existence for over 10 years and with almost 3,400 enterprises
participating in the 1980's, some type of information on the
impact must have been forthcoming. Furthermore, knowing that
the subsidy equivalent of this measure in 1983 approximately
equaled the entire budget of the Ministry of Labour some de-
tectable results should be available . Should this not be the
case, there could be reason to believe that - for the most
part - the subsidies have been accepted without necessarily
intending to use then to significantly increase the produc-
tivity of the employees beyond levels which would have pre-
vailed anyhow.
Not being able to access microdata from a sample of firms
which did and didn't take advantage of this incentive, but
rather drawing on calculations (Braga, Table 5.1) made from
4735 firms in 29 industrial subsectors (i.e. 3-4 digit break-
down of Brazilian industrial code), the following can be
established: Of five key variables used in subsector correla-
tions with a firm-level productivity indicator (value added/
employee) expenditures on training the work force proved to be
significant in 7 cases. In 5 of these cases the expenditures
variable revealed the highest degree of correlation among the
The subsidy equivalent of this incentive was calculated by
multiplying the average nominal monthly wage received by the
cohort earning 1-2 minimum wages in 1983 by the number of
workers participating in the program. This resulted in a
total wage bill which was then multiplied by an assumed
marginal tax rate of 40%. The estimated 50000 million cru-
zeiros calculated thereby compares with roughly the same
amount for the budget of the Ministry of Labour in 1983.37
selected independent variables (see Appendix Table A3 for a
summary of the results). While these results may not seem to
be convincing, it has to be remembered that only about 5% of
the employed in Brazil are trained annually with the help of
this incentive. If the trained were distributed across the
sectors in accordance with sectoral employment shares, it
would be surprising enough to determine that such a small
influence would be sufficient to generate highly significant
correlations between the individual firms. However, the di-
stribution surely follows other criteria (e.g. the basic need
of sector for more skilled personnel) and thus it is actually
all the more surprising to find that expenditures on training
were significantly (positively) correlated with productivity
levels in almost 25% of the sectors (i.e. 7 out of 29) . In
other words: the training incentive - as deduced from these
results based on expenditures for training employees - does
seem to make a significant difference.
These results notwithstanding the demands being placed on
improving education and skill levels of the labour force are
increasing, not only due to government policies in promoting
non-traditional or rather technology-intensive industries
(e.g. in the informatics sector) , but also given the ever
faster pace with which structural changes through cut the world
are taking place. In light of the large differences in educa-
tional attainment levels between Brazil and its East Asian
competitors (see Table 2) as well as the perceived relatively
low standing of skilled labour in Brazil vis-ei-vis eight other
developing countries, efforts to improve programs and infra-
structure are needed and have been undertaken. These are basi-
cally occuring within the above described framework (e.g.
SENAI and SENAC) through expanding and upgrading services
offered . Since the explicit participation of enterprises
and other relevant institutions is being requested, it can be
expected that the high degree of end-user control (as noted
One such project involves a US$ 75 mill, loan from the World
Bank.38
earlier), which characterizes Brazilian training programs as
opposed to those in many other Latin American countries, will
continue. In other words, the Brazilian set-up has not been
inflicted or rather is evidently less prone to the inefficien-
cies of solely state-run systems, which develop large bureau-
cracies . Furthermore, the set-up of the system itself, with
rather clearly delineated target groups, has meant that dupli-
cation of training facilities and thus misallocation of re-
sources has usually been avoided.
If the skill levels can be adequately improved with the above
measures, then there still remains the problem of improving
the general level of education. With the state currently car-
rying out policies to reduce government expenditures in order
to attempt to abide by IMF conditions it finds itself in a
dilemma: By cutting expenditures on educational services or by
not increasing them it is trading off a short-term improvement
in its debt management problems for a longer term neglect of
2
its human capital potential . Although so far the State has
assumed the prime role in attempting to provide the necessary
general educational and training facilities and courses, there
weald seem to be no reason why such areas, particularly as
concerns higher level technical and scientific education,
should not be subjected to greater competition, i.e. by com-
pletely opening up the market for private enterprises, whereby
foreign as well as domestic institutions should be permitted.
As a matter of fact, it is quite easy to imagine a constella-
tion of productive cooperation and competition between state,
corporate and private educational facilities, for instance in
the case of the automobile industry in Brazil. Since traditio-
nal areas of interests can clearly be delineated, the main
areas of activities could be initially established. Whether
and to what degree the original division of labour would re-
main, would - in the longer run - depend upon the capabi-
lities of each group to establish a reputation and seek put
The training programs are financed through a 1% payroll tax
which is merely funnelled through the social security system
to the respective agencies themselves.
2
See for instance Sachs (1987), pp. 38-40.39
other areas where educational/training services can be offer-
ed. Perhaps the dilemma posed by financial constraints can
lead to a more efficient solution than would otherwise have
been contemplated.
VI. Summary and Concluding Remarks
It was shown above that Brazil's stellar economic growth and
export performance in the decade and a half prior to 1980 was
aptly reflected in overall labour market trends (see Table 1).
However, since the second oil price increase, the ensuing
rapid increase in inflation rates as well as the consequences
of the large external debt, weaknesses in Brazil's economic
framework have become apparent and their ramifications for the
ability to efficiently tap Brazil's labour potential can no
longer be overlooked. While it was primarily pointed out that
the wide range of labour market interventions (see Table 3)
has made it all the more difficult for firms to employ labour
in line with its expected productivity (e.g. unskilled lab air
was crowded out of the formal labour market), other measures
(e.g. export incentives or regional incentives for the North-
east) have made it all the more attractive to employ capital
or human-capital intensive methods of production (see for
instance Tyler [1985], p. 232) . As noted in connection with
discussing Table 3, Brazil's competitive position in producing
lab oar-intensive products particularly vis-a-vis its Asian
rivals, like South Korea and Taiwan, was negatively influenc-
ed; the case of the clothing exports could also be pointed cut
(see Table 8) . In the case of the Asian rivals (which were
also successful exporters of clothing) the labour markets
remained quite free of policies either directly or indirectly
increasing the price of labour relative to those of other fac-
tors of production. On top of this, these countries also al-
As Tyler (p. 235) notes, the present trade regime is highly
repressive and distortionary and substantial allocative
gains could be reaped if changes were effected. Specific-
ally: "economic policies have denied the country significant
benefits from international trade".40
ready possess a labour force with higher education/skill le-
vels, thereby giving them a greater potential to adjust to
changes in production/demand patterns.
Where does Brazil stand now as concerns the ability of its
entrepreneurs, be they domestic or foreign, to efficiently tap
the labour potential with which it is endowed? Without being
able to predict the outcome of crucial ongoing deliberations
surrounding the new Constitution, which will consequently
shape the labour code, it nonetheless does not seem likely
that major shifts away from less intervention in the labour
market will be occurring. Rather, as pointed out above, there
is even discussion about improving on job security conditions.
Moves in this direction will no doubt also be supported by the
unions, whose activities have been increasing in recent years.
However, as experienced in other countries shows, the more
such measures are enacted, the greater the increase will be in
the size of informal sector, where unregulated labour markets
prevail. These in turn can be tapped by those companies still
in the formal sector. In a more positive vein the elimination
of accelerated indexation of the lowest wage groups as well as
an attempt to reduce incentives on capital means that it
should become easier to achieve higher employment levels, i.e.
effect more efficient methods or production. Likewise the
ongoing restructing of export incentives, to bring them in
line with accepted international trade rules and a probable
reduction of protection rates will also promote production in
labour-intensive areas which were put at a disadvantage by the
prevailing trade regime.
Last but not least, the efforts being made to upgrade skill
levels in Brazil seem to be structured in an efficient manner
and - given the above positive measures - should help ensure
that skilled lab oar shortage difficulties are mitigated in the
future. To the extent that future skill demands are thus ade-41
quately met, Brazil will find it all the easier to open its
market to imports from economies at lower levels of develop-
ment, producing goods which no longer represent Brazil's com-
parative advantage. In doing so Brazil will be doing unto
other countries as ICs did unto it, by allowing (most) imports
to enter rather than erecting prohibitive tariff/non-tariff
barriers. While such liberalization steps will help dampen
protectionistic threats from abroad, at home they will serve
Brazil's own interests by enabling its industries to more
efficiently tap world markets for the lowest priced inputs.
Ergo, conditions will be engendered which will permit compa-
nies in Brazil to maintain or improve their international
competitiveness - economic resources could then be directed
away from debt-solving to money-making activities.42
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Note: Ranking determined by export shares in 1978. Underlined values are above respec-
tive average in given year.
Average annual growth rate. - Share in total manufacturing exports (based on ISIC di-
vision 3, excluding 353 and 354, i.e. petroleum and petroleum products) or employment. -
3Sum of listed sectors. - Billion US-$. - Million employees.
Source: Own calculations; for exports, based on unpublished UNCTAD data; for employment,
growth rate based on EIU (1986), p. 17; shares based on IBGE (1986), p. 402.43
Table A2 - Concentration (%) of Employment in Selected Sectors/Industries




































































% of employees in a given establishment size








































in the same breakdown. - Multiples of minimum wage
























Source: Adapted from Carvalho (pp. 132 and 138).44
Table A3 - Some Determinants of Labour Productivity in Selected Industries: Evidence






























































































































































Out of original table ocntaining 29 industries only those industries were selected where
correlations were significant. - Largest correlation coefficient ranked first. In the
case of sales/capital assets industry 1020 (lime) has the highest correlation coefficient
(0.799). The same industry also exhibited a significant correlation coefficient with R+D
expenditures, but here it was only ranked third.
Source: Adapted from Braga (1987), Table 5.1.References
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